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CONCLUSIVENESS OF UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY-
INTERESTED WITNESSES
New Mexico. In Morris v. Cartwright,' an action against a truck
owner arising out of a collision, defendants specially denied that
the driver of the truck was operating the same while in the course
of his employment. The driver testified that he was using the
truck without authority or permission of the owners on a Sunday
evening to visit his grandmother and while returning home, the
accident occurred. The owner of the truck testified that he per-
mitted the driver to keep the truck at his home to be used in
emergency cases; that the truck was not to be used for his personal
pleasure at any time; and that on the occasion in question, the
truck had been used without authority or permission. It should
be noted that at least one and perhaps both of these men were
interested witnesses. Said the court: "This evidence is undisputed
and must be accepted as true. It was, therefore, the duty of the
court to declare as a matter of law that the Cartwrights [owners]
were free from negligence and direct a verdict accordingly."12
The plaintiff relied upon the fact that mere ownership by the
defendant raised a presumption that the driver used the vehicle
in the owner's service. But the court said that this presumption
disappears when evidence on the other side was introduced and
was uncontradicted. Plaintiff also relied upon inferences allow-
able from the facts that tools and pipes were found in the truck
and that the driver was dressed in working clothes at the time of
the collision. However, this evidence was said to raise a mere
suspicion, and "such doubtful inferences are not sufficient to
contradict positive testimony. '
For its ruling that "[t]his evidence is undisputed and must be
'57 N. M. 328, 258 P. 2d 719 (1953).
258 P. 2d at 722.
aId. at 723.
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accepted as true," the court felt it unnecessary to cite authority.
In Waters v. Blockson,4 decided a few months later, the ques-
tion was whether or not a deed had been delivered so as to pass
title from the decedent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had had
possession of the deed, which purported to pass title to him, at two
different times during the life of the grantor. The court stated:
The evidence relied on by... [plaintiff] with respect to delivery of
the deed.., is the testimony of himself and wife, in addition to the
presumption... arising from the possession of the deed on two occa-
sions. He testified that the grantor immediately after having the deed
prepared, handed it to him with directions to have it recorded. But
the trial court was not required to accept as true the sworn testimony
of the witness. [Citing California cases.] The general rule that uncon-
tradicted testimony cannot be disregarded by the court, is subject to
many qualifications and exceptions. As it is the duty of the trial court
to determine what credit and weight shall be given to the testimony,
an appellate court will not disturb a finding or conclusion denying
credence, unless it appears that there are no facts or circumstances
which at all impair the accuracy of the testimony. [Citing a California
case.] That the trial court concluded the instant case is an exception
to the rule, is clear.5
To rebut the contention that the testimony was uncontradicted,
the court noted the following circumstances: there was conflict
within the plaintiff's own testimony; a letter to the heirs of dece-
dent from plaintiff treated the property as that of the heirs;
decedent had paid the taxes, insurance and improvement costs on
the land during the existence of the deed. The court did not men-
tion the fact that the testimony was that of an interested witness.
It is surprising that neither of these opinions cited the earlier
opinion of this same court in Medler v. Henry.' In that case the
court reviewed the authorities and, noting the split of authority
elsewhere, found "no inconsistency in the decisions of this juris-
diction." The rule was said to be already established thus:
457 N. M. 368, 258 P. 2d 1135 (1953).
5 258 P. 2d at 1137.
6 44 N. M. 275, 101 P. 2d 398 (1940).
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. . the testimony of a witness, whether interested or disinterested, can-
not arbitrarily be disregarded by the trier of the facts; but it cannot
be said that the trier of facts has acted arbitrarily in disregarding
such testimony, although not directly contradicted, whenever any of
the following matters appear from the record:
(a) That the witness is impeached by direct evidence of his lack
of veracity or of his bad moral character, or by some other legal method
of impeachment.
(b) That the testimony is equivocal or contains inherent improb-
abilities.
(c) That there are suspicious circumstances surrounding the trans-
action testified to.
(d) That legitimate inferences may be drawn from the facts and
circumstances of the case that contradict or cast reasonable doubt
upon the truth or accuracy of the oral testimony.7
Professor Wigmore says, "... the mere assertion of any witness
does not of itself need to be believed, even though he is unim-
peached in any manner; because to require such belief would be
to give a quantitative and impersonal measure to testimony....
The contrary holding he calls a "loose and futile but not uncom-
mon heresy." 9 Still, Mr. Wigmore cites many cases supporting this
"heresy," and there can be no doubt that a substantial minority
holds in accord with it. This is, in fact, one of the most confused
fields in trial law, and even within a given jurisdiction there is
apt to be little uniformity.'
7101 P. 2d at 403. Emphasis added.
8 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2034.
9 7 Id., § 2034 n.3.
10 "The credibility of witnesses is for the jury; but they must not be permitted to
run away with the case.
"All agree that the jury must not believe impossibilities. Beyond this there
is no rule generally applicable. As applied to uncontradicted testimony there
are two broad rules: one, that the uncontradicted testimony of a witness is for
the jury; the other, that the jury may not arbitrarily reject the uncontradicted
testimony of a witness; and the courts apply one or the other as they mean to
leave the matter to the jury, or to interfere. In the statement of those two rules
the courts sometimes give preference to the power of the jury, and sometimes,
on the other hand, require the jury to accept uncontradicted testimony unless
there is some apparent reason against it.... Sometimes the two rules are given
in combined or double form." Note, 8 A.L.R. 796, 797 (1920).
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There is a further conflict as to whether or not a different rule
should apply to interested and disinterested witnesses." The major-
ity hold that the testimony of an interested witness, though uncon-
tradicted, is for the trier of fact. Among this group are jurisdic-
tions which give binding effect to uncontradicted testimony when
the witness is not interested.
However, the statement of rules in this area may be of small
aid. "The rule has been stated as one of quite general application
that the testimony of a party, or an interested witness, does not
conclusively establish the fact testified to, although there is no
evidence directly contradictory thereto, since the credibility of
the testimony of such a witness presents a question of fact for the
jury. This general rule, however, . . . is subject to so many
exceptions as to deprive it of any actual force, except as the fact
of interest is to be considered in weighing the testimony of the
witness in connection with inconsistent evidence or probabilities,
or his own admissions.
"Indeed, there is but little real support for the frequently stated
rule that the interest of a witness renders his uncontradicted testi-
mony a question for the jury. In the following cases, statements
of the character referred to may be found, but the rule will not
be found to have been applied except where the testimony of the
interested witness, while not directly contradicted, was neverthe-
less inconsistent with other portions of his testimony, with other
evidence, or with the natural probabilities, or the conduct or atti-
tude of the witness was such as to cast suspicion upon his credi-
bility .... 11
A careful reading of the Medler case suggests that the rule
treating interested and disinterested witnesses alike was not the
necessary and perhaps not even the proper result of its review
11 Ibid.
12 Note, 72 A.L.R. 27, 32 (1931).
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of the authorities.1" Nevertheless, since the time of that case, the
court has followed the rule in application as well as in statement.
14
The two cases which occasion this writing, while citing no New
Mexico cases on the point, are consistent with the rule in that
neither mention the fact that the witnesses were interested. Nor
was this a consideration sub silentio, as witness the Morris case
in which the testimony was held conclusive.
INDISPENSABLE EVIDENCE-EXPERT OPINION
Oklahoma. In United Ins. Co. v. McElwee 5 the court, with a
brief recital of an established Oklahoma rule, settled a cause of
action which would have probably occasioned more difficulty in the
courts of other jurisdictions. Plaintiff had been rendered blind by
optical atrophy and was attempting to establish as the cause some
incident which would make the injury compensable under a policy
issued by the defendant. The only medical witness was a doctor to
whom plaintiff had gone for treatment. The doctor specified a num-
ber of possible causes of optical atrophy but explained that he did
not know the cause of the plaintiff's condition. He did, however,
negative as possible causes a blow on the head and getting cement
in the eye-both of which had been relied upon by plaintiff in his
search for a causal incident. Holding there was no evidence that
the loss of sight resulted from an accidental bodily injury, the
court said, "Recently" . . . we affirmed our previous holdings on
the point involved by declaring that it is the settled rule in this
state that where injuries are of such character as to require skilled
and professional persons to determine the cause and extent there-
13 As the Medler case shows, the history of the rule in New Mexico has grown out
of the leading New York case, Hull v. Littauer, 162 N. Y. 569, 57 N. E. 102 (1900).
For strong criticism of an interpretation of this case which is the same as the New
Mexico interpretation at least since the Medler case, see Bobbe, The Uncontradicted
Testimony of An Interested Witness, 20 Cornell L. Q. 33 (1934).
14 Heron v. Gaylor, 52 N .M. 23, 190 P. 2d 208 (1947) ; Citizens Finance Co. v. Cole,
47 N. M. 73, 134 P. 2d 550 (1943).
15 ............ Okla ......... 258 P. 2d 609 (1953).
16 In Spivey v. Attebury, 205 Okla. 493, 238 P. 2d 814 (1951).
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of, the question is one of science and must necessarily be deter-
mined by testimony of skilled professional persons.""
The rule is thus stated in a long series of cases growing out of
Willet v. Johnson"8 in 1904.1' It has proven more difficult to for-
mulate a concise, workable test of when the injuries "are of such
character as to require skilled and professional persons to deter-
mine the cause and extent thereof." First the test was said to be
whether "the injury was objective rather than subjective."2 Then
a better statement was made: whether "[t]he symptoms of the
injury were subjective and not objective."'" Finally, in Inter Ocean
Oil Co. v. Marshall,22 counsel cited to the court two earlier opin-
ions which were in apparent, but certainly not real, conflict, and
the court found it necessary to make a more careful analysis of
the application of the rule. Reasoning from the necessity of the
rule, the court realistically indicated that a number of factors
might enter in, and that probably no definition would suffice.
Actually, to attempt such a definition would be to assume that
there is a distinct line between the expert and the non-expert,
which assumption cannot be sustained. The court said, "The ele-
ments of time, of the exclusion of the inference that any other
cause intervened or caused it, and of clear physical evidence of
the event or cause to which it is attributed when shown, and are
so correlated that a man of general common sense and practical
17 258 P. 2d at 610, 611.
18 13 Okla. 563, 76 Pac. 174.
19 But see Comment, 5 Okla. L. Rev. 336, 341 (1952):
"Appointment of Experts. With the exception of sanity determinations in
the county court the acquisition of expert witnesses is strictly a matter of partisan
strategy among the litigants to any given case."
20 Okla. Union Ry. v. Bertrand, 129 Okla. 263, 264 Pac. 621, 622 (1928).
21 City of Pawhuska v. Crutchfield, 155 Okla. 222, 8 P. 2d 685, 686 (1932). Another
test was given in Empire Oil and Refining Co. v. Fields, 181 Okla. 231, 73 P. 2d 164,
165 (1937) : "... where a person's physical condition is such that medical testimony
is necessary to describe it and to ascribe the cause therefor, such medical testimony
must be given to the jury before a trial court is justified in submitting the issue to the
jury."
22 166 Okla. 118, 26 P. 2d 399 (1933).
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experience can draw but one conclusion, the necessity or reason
supporting the opinion evidence rule are [sic] absent."28
There can be no doubt that the rule is proper and beneficial.
Even a generalization that expert testimony would be required
wherever it would be allowed might be reasonably supportable,"
but it is not logically necessary and would probably lead to confu-
sion. However, there are some inferences which the jury is not
qualified to make; some situations in which it should be their
function to believe or disbelieve inferences made by others. Con-
sider upon what basis the jury evaluates the diagnoses of medical
and scientific experts. Here a very sensitive area is touched, one
in which the law is open to the criticism that it has not kept up
with and does not recognize the advances of science and the other
professions. These criticisms in their extreme forms become pro-
posals that certain decisions be delegated entirely to boards of
experts. The law has responded in some fields.25 No doubt other
areas exist in which the inference of the jury, if left unfettered,
may produce results which experts cannot accept. Just as it is
difficult for the layman to understand how wrong may be his ideas
as to legal rules, interpretations and consequences, so may it be
23 26 P. 2d at 403.
24 Professor Wigmore writes: "There is no general policy or rule that requires
expert testimony to form a part of the evidence on subjects open to expert testimony.
... On any and every topic, only a qualified witness can be received; and where the
topic requires special experience, only a person of that special experience will be re-
ceived. If therefore a topic requiring such special experience happens to form a main
issue in the case, the evidence on that issue must contain expert testimony, or it will
not suffice.
"Now such an issue is rarely found. Generally, the topics on which only an expert
witness can be received form usually but one element in the main issuable fact. More-
over, generally, the parties are eager enough to produce such expert testimony without
any rule to require them." 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2090.
Note that Professor Wigmore is here concerned with whether expert as distinguished
from lay testimony will be required. The cases under discussion show that a prior
problem is whether any direct evidence at all is to be required in certain situations,
or whether the jury will be allowed to make certain inferences alone.
Mr. Wigmore then points out two well established exceptions in which expert testi-
mony is universally required: (1) in actions against physicians or surgeons for mal-
practice and (2) in committal proceedings on the ground of insanity. The latter sit-
uation is usually dealt with by statute, and such statutes exist in Arkansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas.
25 See last part of note 24 supra.
[Vol. 8
1954] SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1953 311
for lawyers to understand how ill-prepared they are to make infer-
fences in certain fields. However, as long as the courts have the
final say, it is improbable that much of the jury's function will
be abandoned in any widespread reshuffling. Indeed, it is surpris-
ing that the Oklahoma rule was immediately stated in such gen-
eral terms.
A recognition of the Oklahoma rule, its scope and application
may be of more than academic interest to lawyers of other
states whose courts are achieving the same results if they do not
arrive at them by so direct a route.
As late as 1943, the Texas courts would have had difficulty in
citing with complete approval the Oklahoma rule.26 In Lumber-
man's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Vaughn" it was admitted that the
decedent had died of poliomyelitis. However, the plaintiff sued
the insurance company to establish accidental death, claiming that
decedent's falling through a ceiling twelve feet to the floor had
injured him so as to make him susceptible to the disease. Although
the fall was established, there was no direct evidence of any
serious injuries resulting therefrom; nor was there medical testi-
mony stating affirmatively that such a fall or the injuries there-
from would probably have had some causal relation to the dis-
ease. The court said that any injuries resulting from the fall
could be found by the jury only by inference, and since an infer-
ence upon an inference is not allowed, the verdict that these sup-
posed injuries had caused the disease was not supported by the
evidence. It would have been interesting to know what the court
would have done if some obvious physical injuries resulted from
the fall and the "inference upon inference" basis for decision
had not been available.
Actually, it is not doubted that the hypothetical situation men-
26 There was language in Texas cases which would support the Oklahoma rule,
but this language had been applied only in cases dealing with malpractice, in which
the requirement of expert testimony has been long established. E.g., Kaster v. Woodson,
123 S. W. 2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) er. rel.
27 174 S. W. 2d 1001 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
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tioned would have resulted in the earlier establishment of the
present Texas rule.28 But it was not until 1947 that a Texas court,
in Scott v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 9 said, "... there are certain
scientific fields wherein the average juror or layman does not
possess the knowledge or information from which to draw his own
conclusion; and must be guided by the opinions of experts who
have acquired scientific information on the subject." In that case
the plaintiff testified that something had blown into his eye and
burned. The doctor to whom he went for treatment found an irri-
tation (conjunctivitis) and a nonmalignant fleshy growth which
the doctor said had developed gradually over the years. Almost
two years later, plaintiff went to another doctor who found a
cancerous tumor in the eye. The doctors testified that the cause of
cancer is not scientifically known; that one theory is that con-
tinuous or chronic irritation of a nonmalignant growth would
cause it. Both were of the opinion that the accident and irritation
of which plaintiff complained had nothing to do with the tumor.
Against the contention that since the doctors did not know the
cause, the jury could as well infer the cause, the court held plain-
tiff's evidence insufficient. The court had available to cite only
Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Vaughn, supra, and another
line of cases which cannot be said to be direct support."0
Nevertheless, the result is to be desired, and it seems now to be
established in Texas."' If the language of the Texas cases seems
to be more restricted than the customary statement of the Okla-
homa rule, it is felt that its application will prove no less broad
and no less helpful. Ronald M. Weiss.
28 The court said: "Granted, for the sake of argument, that Virgil suffered an injury
to his spinal cord at the place where the infection struck, it would be the sheerest
speculation to say that he would not have the disease without the injury. All of the
doctors ... said that they did not know of any case ... in which a victim had suffered
poliomyelitis following an injury of the kind described in the present case." Id. at 1005.
29 204 S. W. 2d 16, 18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) er. ref. n.r.e.
30 Coxson v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 142 Tex. 344, 179 S. W. 2d 943 (1944), and cases
cited therein.
81 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blazier, 228 S. W. 2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) er. dism.;
Brown v. Shannon West Texas Memorial Hospital, 222 S. W. 2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949) er. ref. n.r.e.
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